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Outperformance in South Africa and Avoiding Single-Stock Risk

Leveraged Loans in a Rising Rate Environment – Carry Factor Dominates

Bonding with Defensive Equity Strategies

Low Style Consistency in Large-Cap and Mid-/Small-Cap Fund Categories

Active Management Lags in Small-Cap Equity

Outperformance in South Africa and Avoiding Single-Stock Risk

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John Welling

Director, Global Equity Indices

S&P Dow Jones Indices

The returns of two liquid equity benchmarks in South Africa with the same target market have been significantly different YTD as of Oct. 26, 2018. Over the period, the S&P South Africa 50 has declined 8.8% while the FTSE/JSE Top 40 has fallen 12.6%—a difference of over 380 bps—a considerable performance gap over a fairly short period of time. This difference may be explained by idiosyncratic risk and a single component included in each index.

Idiosyncratic Risk Can Hurt Performance

Idiosyncratic risk occurs when a single stock or asset drives portfolio performance for reasons apart from macroeconomic forces. Stocks often underperform, can free fall due to scandal, and may even declare bankruptcy. The opposite may be true on the upside, when company valuations gain by multiples over relatively short periods of time. However, in a well-diversified portfolio, the effect of these moves are typically contained due to the offsetting performance of other assets. In the case of the FTSE/JSE Top 40, however, there is one stock—Naspers—that has largely driven the direction of the index YTD.

Naspers Moves an Index

Naspers forms approximately 20% of the FTSE/JSE Top 40, whereas in the S&P South Africa 50, the stock weight forms half of that—about 10%.[i] Naspers owns a 31.1% share of Tencent, and while its share value has dropped 36% YTD, indices (and portfolios) with outsized exposures to Naspers have suffered as a consequence. Exhibit 1 illustrates the YTD performance of each index alongside the performance of Naspers and Tencent. The exhibit shows that large single-stock exposure has been a driving force behind the varied performance of the two indices.

Capping Mitigates Single-Stock Risk

Capping is not a new concept for indices and can potentially be a way to avoid outsized single-stock exposure. For the S&P South Africa 50, each stock is limited to a 10% single-stock cap, which is applied quarterly in order to enhance diversification and meet the needs of market participants who are subject to regulatory requirements regarding single-stock concentration. The result is that in the S&P South Africa 50, the top three stocks compose roughly 30% of the index. In contrast, the same three stocks make up over 42% of the FTSE/JSE Top 40’s weight.[ii] The inclusion of 10 additional stocks in the S&P South Africa 50 likewise helps to further diversify the index and spread out risk across 25% more companies.

Conclusion

While the recent decline of Naspers highlights the potential benefits of greater diversification in the S&P South Africa 50, the improved performance is not limited to recent history. Exhibit 2 shows that the benefits of diversification have historically led to greater total returns, lower risk, and therefore improved risk-adjusted returns across the examined periods.

[i] Figures as of Sept. 28, 2018.

[ii] Figures as of Sept. 28, 2018.

The posts on this blog are opinions, not advice. Please read our Disclaimers.

Leveraged Loans in a Rising Rate Environment – Carry Factor Dominates

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Hong Xie

Former Senior Director, Global Research & Design

S&P Dow Jones Indices

Since the end of 2015, the U.S. Federal Reserve has raised the policy rate eight times to currently 2.0%-2.25%. The minutes of the recent September FOMC meeting reiterated the committee’s positive growth outlook and confidence on 2% inflation. Market players continued to catch up on pricing future Fed hikes. Currently the market is implying approximately one more hike in 2018 and two more in 2019.

With expectations of higher rates ahead, leveraged loans remain highly attractive for market participants, due to their feature of coupon reset at a spread over a floating index (mostly the three-month LIBOR rate). In addition, leveraged loans generally provide higher protection than traditional high-yield bonds, since the loans are secured with collateral.  Against that backdrop, we show a few salient characteristics of the S&P/LSTA U.S. Leveraged Loan 100 Index to provide additional color for this segment.

Exhibit 1 compares total and price returns for the index since January 2002 (the index inception). Except during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, the price return of the index has been stable and flat. In an orderly market, loans don’t provide much price appreciation due to the combination of floating LIBOR rate, lack of call protection, and possible refinancing at lower spreads. However, the index delivered a cumulative 113% on a total return basis over the same period. The figure demonstrates that carry is the dominating source of return historically for leveraged loans over mid- to long-term investment horizons.

Exhibit 2 shows the index yield[1] against the three-month LIBOR and the index’s average LIBOR spread. Though the spreads for loans have decreased since 2016, rising LIBOR rates have more than offset the spread narrowing and have pushed index yield to increase since 2017. The lower loan spreads also partially reflect the improving credit quality of the loan index (see Exhibit 3).

Against the macroeconomic backdrop of future rate hikes and tighter monetary policy, it is not difficult to see why leveraged loans are popular among market participants in search of a protective cushion against rising rates. Our analysis shows that it is important to pay close attention to the yield/carry level of this segment.

[1] Yield for loans is calculated with current coupon adjusted for price discount/premium.

The posts on this blog are opinions, not advice. Please read our Disclaimers.

Bonding with Defensive Equity Strategies

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Fei Mei Chan

Former Director, Core Product Management

S&P Dow Jones Indices

“The aim of the wise is not to secure pleasure, but to avoid pain.”

– Aristotle

Recent volatility in equity markets may be unsettling to some investors. Skittishness about the stock market is understandable, especially in the context of the serenity in 2017. Volatility levels are relatively higher and risk is on the radar of investors’ consciousness again.

Historically, bonds have been the preferred asset class in times of turmoil. The bull market for bonds in the last 30+ plus years meant the tradeoff in returns wasn’t that much of a sacrifice. But, as the chart below shows, at current interest rate levels, bonds as a means of defense are less attractive than they’ve typically been.

In this context, we looked at defensive equity strategies as a means of lowering overall portfolio risk. The S&P 500 Low Volatility Index is the classic example of a risk-reducing strategy; the index tracks the 100 least volatile stocks in the S&P 500.   As the chart below reflects, this index has consistently delivered less volatility than the S&P 500 from 1991 to 2017 on a 10-year rolling basis.  Despite its lower risk profile, the S&P 500 Low Volatility Index has, anomalously, outperformed the S&P 500 in the 27+ years from 1991 to year-to-date 2018.

More recently, during this year’s two major market declines on February 5, 2018 (S&P 500: -4.1%) and October 10, 2018 (S&P 500: -3.3%), the low volatility index also lived up to its objective, outperforming the S&P 500 on both days.  

Low Volatility is perhaps the quintessential defensive equity strategy, but it’s by no means the only one.  Our new paper, Defense Beyond Bonds, provides a deeper discussion of risk-mitigating approaches to equity management.

 

 

 

 

The posts on this blog are opinions, not advice. Please read our Disclaimers.

Low Style Consistency in Large-Cap and Mid-/Small-Cap Fund Categories

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Akash Jain

Director, Global Research & Design

S&P BSE Indices

Style plays an important role in an investor’s asset allocation decisions. In the SPIVA India Mid-Year 2018 Scorecard, one can notice the low style consistency, especially in the Indian Equity Large-Cap and Indian Equity Mid-/Small-Cap categories. The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) circular dated Oct. 6, 2017, mandated the following important directives for the Mutual Fund Industry.[1]

  1. It defined five equity size categories ranked by total market capitalization:
    1. Large Cap (80% of assets invested in equity; ranked from 1-100)
    2. Mid Cap (65% of assets invested in equity; ranked from 101-250)
    3. Small Cap (65% of assets invested in equity; ranked from 251-500)
    4. Multi Cap (65% of assets invested in equity)
    5. Large and Mid Cap (at least 35% of assets invested in large caps and at least 35% assets in mid caps)
  2. It obligated mutual funds to manage only one product offering in each category. Therefore, a fund house with multiple offerings in the same category would have to either merge, liquidate, or change the style of its existing schemes to the same category if necessary.

These mandates have had important implications for the mutual fund industry and investors. The fund houses had to not only align their portfolios as per the size definitions laid out, but they also had to ensure a unique offering in each size category. For example, as per the second rule, a mutual fund house offering two large-cap schemes would have to either liquidate one scheme, merge it into another scheme, or change the style of one of the offerings.

The aforementioned implications may have been one of the reasons for the relatively lower style consistency over the one-year period ending in June 2018, as funds would have initiated the process to align their product offerings with SEBI’s guidelines.

Exhibit 1: Style Consistency in the Indian Equity Large-Cap and Mid-/Small-Cap Categories
FUND CATEGORY INDIAN EQUITY LARGE-CAP INDIAN EQUITY MID-/SMALL-CAP
Total Funds Available in June 2017 66 45
Style-Consistent Funds 28 33
Style-Inconsistent Funds 38 12
Category Style Consistency (%) 42.4 73.3

Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC, Morningstar, and Association of Mutual Funds in India. Data from June 30, 2017, to June 30, 2018. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Table is provided for illustrative purposes.

For example, in the case of the 66 large-cap funds available at the end of June 2017,[2] three failed to survive the one-year investment horizon. During this period, a total of nine funds moved to the newly defined focused fund category, eight moved to the large- and mid-cap fund category, and nine moved to the multi-cap fund category (see Exhibit 2). This resulted in an overall style consistency of 42.4% for Indian Equity Large-Cap funds over the one-year period ending in June 2018 (see Exhibit 1).

For the Indian Equity Mid-/Small-Cap fund category, the style consistency was higher than for large caps, at 73.3%. Few funds moved to the new large- and mid-cap, multi-cap, and focused fund categories.

Exhibit 2: Breakdown of Style Inconsistency in Funds
MORNINGSTAR CATEGORIES INDIAN EQUITY LARGE-CAP INDIAN EQUITY MID-/SMALL-CAP
Total Style Inconsistent Funds 38 12
Dead Funds 3
India Fund Aggressive Allocation 1
India Fund Children 1
India Fund Contra 1
India Fund Dynamic Asset Allocation 3
India Fund Equity – Other 3 1
India Fund Focused Fund 9 2
India Fund Large & Mid-Cap 8 3
India Fund Large-Cap NA
India Fund Mid-Cap NA
India Fund Multi-Cap 9 2
India Fund Small-Cap NA
India Fund Value 1 3

Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC, Morningstar, and Association of Mutual Funds in India. Data as of June 30, 2018. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Table is provided for illustrative purposes.

A change in style during the investment tenure may potentially affect the risk/return characteristics of a portfolio. For example, a multi-cap fund offering participation to small-cap stocks has the potential to augment returns but at a higher risk and potential drawdown in comparison with a large-cap fund, which may not have been an investor’s initial expectation at the time of investment.

[1]   Data from SEBI. https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/oct-2017/categorization-and-rationalization-of-mutual-fund-schemes_36199.html

[2]   Data as per Morningstar category classifications.

The posts on this blog are opinions, not advice. Please read our Disclaimers.

Active Management Lags in Small-Cap Equity

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Hamish Preston

Head of U.S. Equities

S&P Dow Jones Indices

Small caps have a reputation among many market participants as being an inefficient asset class that lends itself to active management.  But our S&P Indices Versus Active (SPIVA®) scorecards have repeatedly challenged this perception.  Exhibit 1 shows that in 13 of the last 17 calendar year periods, the majority of actively managed, small-cap U.S. equity funds failed to beat the S&P SmallCap 600®.

Exhibit 1:  Most Small-Cap U.S. Equity Funds Have Underperformed Each Year

More recently, our latest U.S. SPIVA results show a whopping 72.88% of small-cap U.S. equity funds underperformed the benchmark in the 12-month period ending June 30, 2018.  While these results may appear perplexing, particularly as small-cap was one of the best-performing asset classes in the same period (the S&P SmallCap 600 rose 20.50%), the choice of benchmark can help to explain the record of relative performance.

The S&P SmallCap 600’s profitability screen made it a more difficult benchmark to beat.

Historically, there has been a significant difference in returns between profitable and non-profitable companies.  For example, cap-weighted portfolios comprising U.S. small-caps with at least four trailing quarters of positive EPS (Group 1) outperformed those without a history of positive EPS (Group 2) between 1994 and 2014.

Exhibit 2: A Positive Earnings Screen Boosted Performance

Source: “A Tale of Two Benchmarks: Five Years Later”, Brzenk and Soe, March 2015

A simple yet effective strategy would have therefore been to screen for profitability, which the S&P SmallCap 600 does.  Compared to less-discerning small-cap benchmarks, this profitability screen has typically offered an annual performance pick-up of around 2%, making the S&P SmallCap 600 more difficult to beat.  For example, while nearly 73% of small-cap U.S. equity managers underperformed the S&P SmallCap 600 in the 12-month period ending June 30, 2018, 63.84% failed to beat the Russell 2000 index.

As a result, understanding the choice of benchmarks used in our semi-annual SPIVA scorecards can help to explain relative performance figures.  Indeed, an understanding of the S&P SmallCap 600’s profitability screen can add color as to when and why active U.S. small-cap equity managers have, or have not, been able to outperform.

 

 

 

 

The posts on this blog are opinions, not advice. Please read our Disclaimers.